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Law and the Emotions
Eric A. Posner1

Introduction
The role of the emotions is much neglected in legal theory. This should be puzzling at
first sight, because emotions play an important role in many areas of the law. Consider the
following problems.
•

A person who kills while angry is usually guilty of a less serious crime than a person who
kills in a calm, unemotional state, but not if the anger is caused by hatred rather than shame.

•

Judges exclude photographs of gory crime scenes, even when the photographs have probative
value, when the photographs are likely to provoke extreme outrage or disgust. The use of
victim impact statements in capital sentencing has been criticized for inflaming the jury
against the defendant and defended as a way of enhancing the jury’s empathy for the victim.

•

A common justification for workplace, environmental, and consumer product regulation is
that individuals lack information about the risks that they face. Unexplored is the role that
fear plays in decisions to fly on airplanes or use air bags, and how agencies should regulate in
response to panics about health risks.

•

Mediators have long known that anger and other emotions interfere with bargaining, but
these emotions are overlooked in contract theory. Emotional response to breach of contract
has important implications for the design of remedies in contract law.

•

Market behavior and responses to cost-benefit surveys often reflect emotional responses that
people disclaim when they are calm. Should this information likewise be discounted by
agencies engaging in cost-benefit analysis, or should it be treated as authentic data on actual
preferences?

These issues raise questions about the relationship between emotion and law, but legal
theory is unprepared to answer them. One reason for the neglect of emotions in legal theory may
be that the dominant strains of normative legal theory -- economic analysis, moral-philosophical
analysis, constitutional analysis -- rely on methodologies that are not well suited to analyzing
emotion, or at least, for reasons of intellectual history, have simply not yet focused on the
emotions. Another reason may be the primitive state of the psychology literature on the topic.
Psychologists themselves admit that they do not have a good theory of the emotions, in part
because research in this area is relatively new. Yet a review of that literature reveals a number of
insights that are sufficiently well-developed to be of value for legal theory. And, indeed, in the
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past few year the emotions have begun to interest a small but growing group of legal theorists.2
This paper contributes to this small literature by providing a simple but useful framework
for analyzing the relationship between law and the emotions. The theory draws on the economic
model of consumer choice, but it does not reduce emotional behavior to rational self-interest, and
instead relaxes the consumer choice model in order to account for emotional behavior.3 The
framework assumes that people’s “calm” preferences, that is, the preferences that they have
when they are not emotionally aroused, differ from their “emotion state” preferences, which are
skewed toward the stimulus that provokes the emotion. Further, people’s abilities and beliefs
about the world often differ in emotion states and calm states. Finally, because people can
anticipate their emotional responses to various conditions, they will often take steps earlier on
either to avoid (or to pursue) these conditions, and to cultivate certain beneficial emotional
dispositions.
The framework does simplify, but it is not simplistic, and it sheds light on the debates
discussed above. Its predictions are fairly straightforward; the main contribution is clarifying the
relationship between emotions and rational action by placing them in the rational choice
framework which is now the standard approach to analyzing private law and some aspects of
public law.4 After discussing the psychology literature (Part I), and laying out the framework
(Part II), I analyze emotions as excuses in criminal and tort law (Part III), the manipulation of the
emotions of juries (Part IV), regulation of emotion-laden risks (Part V), bargaining in contract
law when parties are emotional (Part VI), and emotions in normative legal theory (Part VII).
I should comment at the outset about the relationship between the current inquiry and the
field of law and cognitive psychology or “behavioral law and economics.” This field has so far
focused on cognition rather than emotion. It focuses on errors in judgment, such as the
underestimation of small probabilities, the reliance on anchoring devices when making
evaluations, the tendency to value items in hand more than items possessed by others, and so
forth. There is, of course, some overlap with emotion. Some cognitive errors are said to be the
result of dread, and some psychologists have recently argued that cognitive biases are best
analyzed as the result of emotional dispositions or feelings.5 But to avoid redundancy with the
2

See, in particular, the essays in The Passions of Law (Susan Bandes ed. 1999); some of these essays and other legal
work on the emotions are cited below.
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This approach differs from the three prominent economic treatments of emotions – those by Becker, Frank, and
Hirshleifer – in the following ways. First, all three authors treat emotions as purely irrational states rather than states
in which preferences and other attributes temporarily change. Second, Frank and Hirshleifer focus on the
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many law articles that use cognitive psychology, I confine myself to understandings of the
emotions that do not overlap too much with the cognitive psychology literature.
I. The Emotions
Although psychology lacks a widely accepted theory of emotion, and many fundamental
issues about the nature of emotion remain unresolved,6 much progress has been made in the last
thirty years, and agreement on some important issues has been achieved. An emotion is one of a
group of psychological phenomena with the following distinctive characteristics.7 Emotions are
usually stimulated by the world, either via the mediation of cognition or through a more
primitive stimulus-response-like neurological mechanism. They have a certain feel or affect
characterized usually by a focus on a particular stimulus with the result that the rest of the
environment “fades” (a little or a lot, depending on the strength of the emotion) though does not
disappear altogether. An angry person feels a kind of warmth and agitation; it is directed usually
at another person, the result of a slight or offense. A person who is disgusted feels a kind of
nausea; it is directed at the object that provokes the disgust. The rest of the world remains, but at
a remove: an angry person might restrain himself because he does not want to be arrested for
assault; a disgusted person might overcome the urge to withdraw because he wants to help a
person with a disgusting wound or he knows that the disgusting substance is an important
medicine. Although emotions are usually accompanied by physiological changes, there does not
appear to be a one-to-one correspondence between the different emotions and physiological
states:8 emotion has an irreducibly mental component.
One useful approach to understanding the emotions is to think about them against the
background of the theory of consumer choice. In doing so, I follow cognitive psychology, which
got its start by criticizing expected utility theory, and, I think, the mainstream literature on the
psychology of the emotions, which appears to understand emotion against an implicit theory of
rational behavior.9
It is immediately clear that emotions are troublesome for the rational choice starting point
that people choose actions in a way that is consistent with their preferences. It is common to
think of emotions as “outside” forces that compel one to act inconsistently with the interests of
the self. This conception is familiar from everyday excuses for offensive conduct. A person
might apologize for insulting someone else by explaining that he was “angry,” or “depressed,” or
“irritable.” The implication is always that the speaker is not fully responsible for his actions,
because he was taken over by his emotions. But this conception is wrong. We hold people
responsible for their emotions.10 If anger was justified by some earlier wrong committed against
the agent, then anger may be an excuse; if it resulted from an innocent mistake, then the anger is
6

Elster, supra note __, at 243; Paul Ekman & Richard Davidson, Introduction, The Nature of Emotion: Fundamental
Questions 3-4 (1994) (describing twelve unresolved questions about the nature of emotions).
7
See Elster, supra note __, at 246-83; other useful sources include Richard S. Lazarus, Emotion and Adaptation
(1991); Carroll E. Izard, The Psychology of Emotions (1991).
8
As hypothesized by William James, see William James, The Principles of Psychology (1890).
9
However, the very idea of the separation of rationality and emotion is problematized in this literature, a vivid
example of which is Antonio R. Damasio, Descartes’ Error: Emotion, Reason, and the Human Brain (1994).
10
As emphasized in Dan M. Kahan & Martha C. Nussbaum, Two Conceptions of Emotion in Criminal Law, 96
Colum. L. Rev. 269, 285-89 (1996) (emphasizing the cognitive content of emotion).

3

University of Chicago Law and Economics Working Paper No. 103

no excuse. Whether or not a person’s emotional state excuses his conduct depends on whether
the person could have avoided the emotion or avoided the stimulus that provoked the emotion,
and whether the emotion reflects acceptable moral beliefs about others and the world.
A better way to think about emotions is to start by noting that a person’s preferences
might have different emotional valences. X has a preference that Y not be around. The
preference could be more or less intense, and let us fix the intensity by supposing that X is
willing to pay $100 to avoid encountering Y. Economic analysis usually stops this point, and
takes this number as given. But it may also be relevant that X’s preferences has an emotional
coloring. X’s emotions toward Y are qualitatively distinct, and this difference cannot be reduced
to a dollar amount. X might hate Y, be angry at Y, or be disgusted with Y – while in all cases
having the same monetized preference to avoid Y.
Do these distinctions matter? In some cases the reduction of emotionally colored desires
for certain world states to a monetized preference ordering is unobjectionable. If we are simply
concerned with deterring certain behavior, and if the emotionality of the desire does not result in
an idiosyncratic influence on decision-making, knowledge of an affected person’s costs and
gains is sufficient for determining policy. For example, the law need not make distinctions on
the basis of a tortfeasor’s emotional state if its only purpose is to ensure that the victim is
compensated for his injury. Angry and calm drivers are sufficiently deterred if they must pay the
social cost of their behavior. But in some contexts the emotional coloring of a preference does
have instrumental and normative consequences.
From an instrumental perspective, the effectiveness of different kinds of sanctions often
depends on a person’s emotion state. An angry person discounts future sanctions but may be
quite sensitive to claims about the provocation. If you push into a person, you are more likely to
avoid being punched in the nose if you tell him that you tripped than if you remind him that he
could go to jail for assault. Anger is also vulnerable to delaying tactics and cooling off periods.
Hatred, by contrast, is a more constant emotion, and also less likely to be extinguished by a
reasonable explanation. Further, we expect irascible people to avoid places where their anger is
likely to be provoked, just as we expect epileptics to avoid driving. Fear, disgust, and the other
emotions all have their different idiosyncrasies, and a well-designed legal system exploits them
differently.
From a normative perspective, the bare fact that a person has acted under the influence of
emotion does not excuse his conduct. In fact, while some emotions mitigate guilt, others
enhance guilt. Anger provoked by betrayal still mitigates guilt; but anger provoked by
unacceptable moral beliefs may increase guilt. Hate rarely excuses murder, but real fear, even if
not fully justified, might mitigate culpability.
Both of these observations assume that people remain rational while under the influence
of emotion; emotion is rarely, if ever, merely a reflex to some external stimulus.11 An angry,
disgusted, fearful, or sad person usually can deliberate about his behavior and does not (with the
possible exception of certain kinds of fear) engage in reflexive action. This suggests that people
11
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continue to act rationally while in an emotion state, even though they act differently from the
way they do in the calm state. One can capture this point by positing that during the emotion
state, people experience usually temporary variations in their preferences, abilities, and/or
beliefs.
Their preferences change so that what psychologists call the “action tendency” of an
emotion becomes relatively attractive. The action tendency of anger is to strike out; so we can
say that a person, while angry, develops a temporary preference to strike the person who offends
him. The action tendency of disgust is to withdraw; a person, while disgusted, develops a
temporary preference to withdraw from the disgusting object. Grief produces withdrawal from
other people and preoccupation with the lost person or thing; fear produces flight from a threat;
pity produces aid. But before and usually after the emotion state, the person’s preferences are
constant (the “calm preferences”), so he might disapprove of what he expects to do, or did, in the
emotion state. It is this inconsistency over time that makes emotional behavior seem irrational;
but it is important to see that a person in an emotion state does not act irrationally given his
temporary preferences.
Abilities may also change in the grip of an emotion. When the emotion state occurs, the
agent may find himself more alert and vigorous, even stronger, or simply less reliant on slowmoving deliberation. The angry person is aroused: he feels less pain, tires less quickly, responds
more rapidly to movement. The anxious or fearful person becomes more alert to the
environment, and flees quickly from danger. A grief-stricken person may experience a decline in
abilities: everything becomes more difficult to do. Evidence of physiological changes –
hormonal changes, increase in the heart rate, and so forth – supports the view that abilities
change during some emotion states.12
Finally, beliefs may change during emotion states. An angry person overestimates the
probability that the offender will attack him, or that the provocation was not an accident but the
result of intent to harm or humiliate. A fearful person overestimates the probability of harm
associated with the threat that causes his fear.13 Joyful people underestimate risks of harm,
pessimistic people overestimate the same risks.
My claim, then, is that during the emotion state, a person acts rationally, that is, internally
consistently, given the new and usually temporary preferences, abilities, and beliefs that he has
in that emotion state. The actions taken during the emotion state will, of course, affect the
agent’s endowments, and this may have consequences for his behavior after the emotion state is
over; but aside from that I assume that preferences, abilities, and emotions during the calm state
are the same before and after the emotion state.14
My final point is that agents anticipate their emotion states, and take actions in
anticipation of them. This brings us to the matter of character. “Emotional disposition” refers to
12

See Richard E. Nisbett & Dov Cohen, Culture of Honor : The Psychology of Violence in the South 47 (1996).
See Ohman, Fear and Anxiety 520, in Lewis & Haviland, supra note __ (the fear “system is biased sometimes to
evoke defense in actually nonthreatening contexts”).
14
To keep the analysis simple, I focus on changes in preferences and generally neglect changes in beliefs and
abilities.
13
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a person’s tendency to feel an emotion, which itself is no doubt connected to genetic, cultural,
and educational factors. An irascible person is more likely to become angry; a fearful person is
more likely to become scared. People usually know their own emotional dispositions and can
take steps to modify them or to avoid conditions that activate them. Suppose, for example, that a
person knows that if he goes to a rowdy bar, he may be insulted, and further he knows that he is
irascible. Upon being insulted, he might strike the person who insults him. To avoid this, he can
(1) knowing about his emotional disposition avoid the bar, or (2) earlier on try to overcome his
irascibility through meditation (or whatever).
These actions are those of a rational person who has self-knowledge, including
knowledge about his emotional disposition. Not all people know everything about their
emotional dispositions, but enough people do enough of the time that we recognize that people
ought to act with attention to their emotional dispositions and blame them if they do not. Indeed,
I will argue below that the criminal law does just this. More generally, law cares about emotions
because (1) a person responds to incentives differently while in calm states and while in emotion
states, and across emotion states, and (2) a person may have some power to change his or her
emotional disposition or to avoid stimuli that provoke certain emotion states that increase the
likelihood of harm to others.
II. A Framework for Analyzing Law and the Emotions
A.

Assumptions

The model of consumer choice assumes that individuals have preferences in the sense
that they are able to rank the various states of the world that will result from their choices. These
preferences are consistent, transitive, and complete. A utility function maps the states of the
world to a number, so that we say that an individual’s utility rises as he obtains increasingly
preferred states of the world. Individuals have certain abilities, which enable them to engage in a
particular action at greater or less cost; and they have budgets that limit the amount of resources
that they can spend in satisfying their preferences.
Economists usually assume that preferences remain stable over the period of time
relevant to analysis. If individuals switch from labor to leisure after an increase of the tax on
their income, the usual explanation is that the opportunity cost of leisure declines, not that the tax
increase happened to coincide with an exogenously caused change in preferences, though of
course the latter is possible as a theoretical matter. The reason for this convention is that
economics has nothing to say about how preferences change;15 so any economic, as opposed to
psychological, explanation for behavior must look to other factors.
I depart from this model, though I hew as closely as possible. I assume that under certain
conditions a “stimulus” will produce an “emotion state,” during which certain otherwise fixed
attributes of the agent change. These attributes then return to what they were before the emotion
state occurred. The attribute on which I will focus is the preference. During the emotion state,
preferences reflect a higher ranking of world states that are relevant to the emotion, or, as I will
sometimes say, the emotion-relevant good will become more intensely preferred. In addition,
15
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abilities may change during the emotion state: the agent may become more or less able to convert
inputs, like time and energy, into outputs like labor or attack. And beliefs may change during the
emotion state: the emotion may cause the agent to believe that an emotion-relevant probability is
higher than the probabilities he attaches to it during the calm state (sometimes, the emotionrelevant probability may be more accurate).16
“Stimulus” refers to the whole set of environmental or interpersonal conditions that,
whether via cognitive interpretation or not, set off an emotional reaction. An insult coming from
a stranger could stimulate anger, or merely seeing someone who has offended the agent in the
past. The observation of sewage or rotting meat could stimulate disgust. Receipt of an award
might stimulate pride or happiness. Learning about a rival’s success stimulates envy.
Observation of a child’s misery might stimulate compassion or pity. In each case, some aspect
of the environment acts as a stimulus of the emotional reaction. As should be clear from these
examples, emotional reaction to a stimulus is not necessarily, or even usually, a reflex action but
often involves an appraisal of surrounding conditions, and all the cognitive work that this term
implies.17
Our final assumption is that people can cultivate their emotions.18 People are selfconscious and generally (though not always) knowledgeable about their emotional dispositions,
recognize when these emotional dispositions lead them astray, and take steps to modify them.
The idea of cultivating (benign) emotions or even emotionless calm is similar to the simpler act
of avoiding stimuli of destructive emotions. A person might seek to control his anger or envy
through meditation, yoga, religious pursuits, and so forth; or by avoidance: he might stop going
to bars where people slight him; he might move away from cities or neighborhoods where
conspicuous consumption is the norm; he might avoid homeless people. In these cases, the
person avoids stimuli of anger, envy, or pity that might get him trouble or simply be unpleasant
to experience. Cultivation of emotional dispositions and simple avoidance are, of course, very
different behaviors, but they can be usefully treated as the same for purpose of analysis.
Students of the emotions will notice that the framework is better suited to some emotions
(fear, disgust, anger) than others, such as love and jealousy. The “higher emotions” are more
complex, have great cognitive content, have less distinct physiological manifestations, are less
uniform across cultures, have fewer obvious correlates in animals, and are – to get to the point –

16

The notion that preferences, abilities, and beliefs change during the emotion state is meant to capture in a very
schematic way the “affect program” theory of the primary emotions (surprise, fear, anger, disgust, sadness, joy).
See, e.g., Paul Ekman, Emotions in the Human Face (1972). The most important idea associated with this theory is
that the primary emotions have a biological basis and evolutionary explanation, and that they act as cognitive
shortcuts, as opposed to ordinary, deliberative cognition, in which people react in adaptive ways to (often,
threatening) stimuli even when this means ignoring certain beliefs (like being scared in the dark even though one
knows that there is nothing to be afraid of). A very useful discussion can be found in Paul E. Griffiths, What
Emotions Really Are ch. 4 (1997).
17
This is the standard view in psychology. See, e.g., Lazarus, supra note __, at 149-52. Appraisal refers to
cognitive processes by which the agent ascertains the personal significance of the stimulus, how it can be dealt with,
what it means for his goals, and so forth. Id.
18
For a similar idea, see Richard H. Thaler & H.M.Shefrin, An Economic Theory of Self-Control, in Quasi Rational
Economics (Richard H. Thaler 1991). Thaler and Shefrin analyze self-control as a purely cognitive phenomenon,
and do not discuss emotions.
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more poorly understood by psychologists.19 Fortunately, they also seem to play a smaller role in
the law, and I will, for the most part, avoid them.
B.

Order of Actions

Our simple model of the emotions assumes a stylized order of events, represented by the
timeline in Figure 1:
Figure 1
__|_____________|_______|________|____________________
invest
stimulus
act
end
post-state
----emotion state----

The first event is the agent’s investment in either cultivating an emotional disposition or
avoiding conditions that will stimulate the emotion. The second event is the application of the
stimulus that provokes an emotion.
Next comes the emotion state. This refers to the actual occurrence of the emotion. It
may last for an instant or for a very long time. For example, the agent might be angered when
someone pushes him from behind, but the anger disappears almost immediately when he sees
that the person who pushed him had tripped on his shoelaces. Envy might fester for months or
years; love and grief also may last for a very long time. In any event, for purposes of analysis it
is assumed that the emotion ends at some definite point and the non-emotional or “calm” state
returns, which here may be designated the “post-state” condition.
During the emotion state the agent chooses to act, just as he does before the state. The
same set of choices presents itself to the agent as before, except of course that the change in
environment that stimulates the emotion might introduce new choices. Before the stimulus, the
agent has no desire to injure person P; after P insults him, he now has such a desire, and may act
on it. But he may not. As noted earlier, the emotion state affects the agent by changing his
preferences so that the emotion-relevant goods are more heavily weighted, and by increasing or
reducing his cost of action. Sanctions and other costs thus continue to influence the agent’s
choice; what is different is that the costs and benefits of action differ, slightly or greatly, from
what they were during the calm state.
After the emotion state ends, the agent returns to the calm state, which means that his
preferences and abilities return to what they were in the pre-emotion state. But his actions
during the emotion state will have changed his endowments, so he may be better or worse off
than he was before the emotion state occurred.
The timeline highly simplifies even the simplest emotions. One problem is that an
emotional experience can be relived, not just reimagined, and so an emotion state will “tail off,”
and sometimes renew itself later in time. I observe a disgusting slime; I withdraw and soon
19

See Griffith, supra note __, at 100-06.

8

Law and the Emotions

forget about it; later the appearance and smell of the syrup I am pouring on my pancakes reminds
me of the slime, and I am again disgusted. Similarly, my anger at an insult renews itself every
time I am reminded of the insult. This complexity needs to be kept in mind.
C.

Analysis

The agent’s choice during the emotion state can be represented using the standard
graphical rendering of consumer choice, as in Figure 2. The vertical axis represents the
“amount” of the emotion-relevant good (Y). If the agent is angry, the axis represents the degree
of injury inflicted on the person at whom the agent is angry; if the agent is disgusted, the axis
represents the degree of withdrawal from the object of disgust; if the agent is in love, it
represents some measure of benefit to the beloved as experienced by the agent. The horizontal
axis represents all the other goods that the agent wants to consume (X).
[FIGURE 2]
The graph depicts the agent’s “normal” or calm-state indifference curve (UN) and the
corresponding emotion-state indifference curve (UE). The emotion-state indifference curve is
flatter than the calm-state indifference curve, representing the fact that in the emotion state the
agent’s preferences for the emotion-relevant good become more intense. The result is that the
agent will give up more of the ordinary goods, than in the normal state, in return for a constant
increase in his consumption of the emotion-relevant goods. The graphical rendering assumes
that the budget line (B) is the same in the calm and emotion state, though as noted above it is
possible that the budget lines would diverge. The emotion-state budget line might shift out or in:
out, if the emotion makes action cheaper (anger); in, if the emotion makes action more costly
(grief). One might assume that, say, anger makes all actions cheaper, in which case the budget
line shifts out in a uniform manner. Alternatively, one might assume that the emotion makes the
emotion relevant good cheaper, in which case the budget line tilts, as when it represents a change
in price.
When emotions make action cheaper, consumption of the emotion-relevant good will
increase, and consumption of the other goods will either increase or decrease. When emotions
make action more costly, consumption of the two kinds of good may rise or fall. And even when
emotions do not change the cost of behavior, they do change preferences, so the pattern of
consumption will change. As a result, the agent’s emotional behavior will usually put him on a
lower indifference curve measured by calm state preferences (the exception being when emotion
reduces the cost of action by a sufficient amount). Call this change the emotion-provoked utility
change (EPUC). A person who lashes out at an enemy while angry might be better off, with
positive EPUC, after the emotion state returns, because the enemy has removed himself, or
because the agent has developed a reputation for toughness; or he may be worse off, with
negative EPUC, because the enemy struck back, or because the agent now finds himself in jail.20
A person in the initial calm state knows that his emotional disposition might get him in
20

In addition, the person may anticipate or regret the his emotion-state actions simply because they are not the
actions he would have taken if he had been in the calm state; in other words, his emotion-state consumption pattern
differs from his hypothetical calm-state consumption pattern, and this alone might be thought of as a utility decline.
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trouble or benefit him. This depends on the environment. A person with an irascible disposition
might do well in a shame society: people avoid abusing him because they fear him. But he might
do poorly in a well-regulated society: a routine altercation might spiral into a fight, landing the
agent in jail. The first person has a positive expected EPUC; the second person has a negative
expected EPUC. (EPUC is defined only with reference to the emotion under consideration: the
same person might be easily disgusted or not, and this might be beneficial in some contexts but
not others.) The second person can be expected to “invest” to minimize his actual EPUC: by
cultivating a sense of calm, or by avoiding places, like bars, where he is likely to be provoked.
It is important to emphasize that EPUC is determined by the calm-state preferences, not
the emotion-state preferences, even though it is generated by actions taken during the emotion
state. This is necessary in order to capture the idea that people in their normal state are different
from what they become in an emotional state, and also that, anticipating this, people will engage
in certain actions in the normal state.
At the investment stage, the agent knows that he may experience the stimulus with some
probability. To keep the analysis simple, let us suppose that during the emotion state,
preferences change but abilities and beliefs do not. The difference between the agent’s
preferences during the calm state and the emotion state depend on the quality and intensity of the
emotion, which is reflected by the slope of the emotion state indifference curve. As can be seen
in Figure 3, the agent will typically consume a different bundle of goods during the emotion state
and during the calm state, just because of the change in preferences. This means that after the
emotion state has subsided and his “calm” preferences have returned, the agent will be either
worse off (as in Figure 3) or better off than he had been in the calm state. If he is worse off, then
we can construct a WTP measure of the difference by constructing a hypothetical budget line in
the usual manner. In Figure 3, the agent would be willing to pay the amount depicted in order to
avoid the consumption results of the emotion state.21
[FIGURE 3]
Ex ante, the agent knows that the change in consumption wrought by the emotional
response will occur with some probability, and so initial investment will reflect this expected
change. Investment in the current example would be to (1) avoid the stimulus, or (2) cultivate a
less sensitive disposition. Sometimes a dollar of investment will be relatively effective
(switching from one bar to another) and sometimes not (developing an ability to turn the other
cheek). The effectiveness of the investment in this way will be denoted by the elasticity of the
emotional response with respect to the investment. A high elasticity indicates greater
responsiveness. This allows us to make the following prediction:
People will invest more in cultivating dispositions or avoiding stimuli as (1) the quality
and intensity of the emotion state increases relative to the calm state (that is, as EPUC
increases); and (2) the elasticity of the emotion state with respect to the investment

21

In Figure 3, the agent’s emotion-state behavior results in the bundle of goods located at the tangency of UE and B.
This puts him on the lower calm-state indifference curve, UN’. To make him indifferent between this bundle and the
original calm-state outcome, the agent must be paid the amount denoted by EPUC.
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increases.22
As an example, consider anger. Anger can occur in predictable and unpredictable ways.
If the agent already hates a person, then he knows that if he encounters that person, there is a
good chance that he will become angry. By contrast, an agent cannot predict when a stranger
will offend him, and he might suppose that his anger will on average be less from a random
incident involving a stranger than with someone he already knows and hates. Thus, it makes
more sense to punish people who are provoked into anger by someone they hate and could avoid,
than to punish people who are provoked into anger during a random encounter with a stranger.
The former are in a better position during their calm state to avoid the encounter, and it is during
the calm state that they are more responsive.
Suppose, instead, that an agent knows about his irascible disposition and has taken a
number of steps to change it. He attends anger management classes. He avoids rowdy bars. He
avoids drinking. Nonetheless, he is provoked to anger and he injures the offender. It again
makes sense to reduce the sanction in order to reward and encourage his behavior during the
calm state. By contrast, people who cultivate angry dispositions should be punished.
D.

Objections

The approach I use drapes the emotions loosely over the rational choice framework,
rather than reducing emotions to matters of choice, or eschewing rational choice altogether. The
benefit of this approach is that it allows one to incorporate emotions into the vast rational choice
literature, rather than start afresh on uncharted terrain. In a similar way, the cognitive
psychology literature has benefited by using expected utility theory as a baseline, and showing
the ways in which individuals depart from the predictions of that theory, rather than (for the most
part) proposing alternative theories of choice. This has allowed people who are skeptical of
rational choice models to take advantage of the law and economics literature even while
criticizing its arguments.
Nonetheless, one can criticize the framework both for departing too much and too little
from the rational choice approach. Too much, because the assumption that preferences and other
attributes change during emotion states seriously weakens predictability. This seems to me
unavoidable; where the rational choice element remains is in (1) the insistence that people
remain rational during the emotion state, so that their behavior will bear some resemblance to
calm-state behavior, and remain responsive to incentives; and (2) the insistence that people can
anticipate and plan around their emotions, by cultivating emotional dispositions and avoiding
stimuli. This leaves some room for predictions, as the discussion of criminal law below will
show; but it must be acknowledged that the main advantage of the rational choice framework is
not the generation of predictions, but the stripping away of conceptual clutter, which allows a
more careful analysis of the ways in which emotion changes the conclusions of existing rational
choice work. It also allows one to examine the complex normative consequences of the fact that
people when calm often disvalue their preferences while emotionally agitated and sometimes
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want their emotional behavior to be restrained.23
One can also argue that the framework departs too little from the rational choice
approach. It is clearly a simplification. Even during the calm state people are affected by
emotions. Just imagining the consequences of future actions may provoke an emotional reaction,
which, though likely to be less intense than the emotions that would be felt during the actions,
are still strong enough to affect deliberation, so that preferences may exhibit a muted instability
even during the calm state, with the choice of action dependent on the agent’s ever-changing
imaginative resources. Further, after the emotion state is over, recollection of the stimulus may
provoke the emotion anew, and so every emotion state may effect a permanent change in
people’s preferences. Finally, I have acknowledged that the framework is more suitable for
analyzing simpler emotions, and not the more complex and long-lasting emotions like love.
I have also ignored many difficult philosophical and psychological questions about
emotions. My justification is my focus on legal questions; lengthy discussion of philosophical
and psychological questions would distract from the simple but important conclusions about the
law, and in any event these questions are already handled by many others. I should note in
passing a philosophical issue that I ignore, just because it has appeared in some legal analysis.24
This issue is the cognitive content of emotion.25 Some people argue that emotions are constraints
on cognition: certain choices available to someone who is calm become unavailable when he is
subject to emotion. For example, it appears to be impossible not to jump back from a striking
snake. Others argue that emotions are themselves cognitive evaluations of states of affairs: grief
about someone’s death, for example, represents a judgment about that person’s value to the
agent. Most of my conclusions assume that emotions have some cognitive component – that
emotional responses involve choices based on emotion-state preferences – but I do not make
broad claims about the nature of emotions.
One charge that cannot be ignored is that the rational choice approach is internally
inconsistent. This argument is implicit in Elster’s discussion of Becker’s model of guilt, in
which guilt is assumed to be just a preference.26 Elster argues:
If guilt were nothing but an anticipated or experienced cost, an agent whose guilt deters
him from stealing or retaining [a] book should be willing to buy a guilt-erasing pill if it
was sufficiently cheap. I submit that no person who is capable of being deterred by guilt
would buy the pill. In fact, he would feel guilty about buying it. For him, taking the pill
in order to escape guilt and be able to steal the book would be as morally bad as just
stealing it.27
To see the problem with this argument, imagine that the agent has a moral dilemma. He
must betray his lover or his country, and in either event he will feel tremendous guilt. Once he
has made the decision, a desire to behave morally does not require the agent to continue to
23
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endure the guilt (which may be overwhelming, paralyzing), and surely he is permitted to take the
pill. Indeed, some people might recognize that their overwhelming sense of guilt, which they
attribute to factors outside themselves such as a psychologically destructive upbringing, prevents
them from doing good things, and would take the pill without becoming, or believing themselves
to be, immoral, and without losing the capacity to act morally. That shame and guilt can be
paralyzing and destructive, at both the individual and social level, is an old theme in
psychology.28 The source of Elster’s confusion is his entanglement of moral and emotional
motivation. A moral person does not want to behave immorally, but he may want to have greater
control over his emotions when otherwise his emotions would lead him morally or prudentially
astray.
The difference between emotion and morality is clearer when one moves from guilt to
other emotions. Consider a skillful doctor who is paralyzed by feelings of disgust during certain
kinds of surgery; or a soldier or police officer who knows that his fearful disposition endangers
other people. Surely, these people can, without fear of conceptual self-contradiction, take pills
that reduce or eliminate, temporarily or permanently, their ability to experience disgust or fear.
Elster is correct that emotions are more than merely preferences, and if his only point
were that a cost-benefit perspective on emotions necessarily excludes many relevant
considerations, he would also be correct. But his further point that this perspective is incoherent,
and so cannot shed light on behavior, is false.
III.

Emotion in Criminal Law

It is sometimes said that a person who commits a crime under the influence of emotion is
less culpable than a person who acts calmly and deliberately. The standard example is of murder
being reduced to voluntary manslaughter if the defendant acted in an uncontrollable rage. But
the truth is more complex. Certain emotion states reduce murder to voluntary manslaughter, but
others do not. For example, under modern hate crime laws a person who kills a gay man because
he “hates” gays or is “disgusted” by gays will be found more culpable than someone who kills
the same man just to get his wallet. This raises the question whether the criminal law’s different
treatments of emotion-influenced crime can be explained on deterrence grounds.
There are two relevant considerations in a deterrence approach to emotional crimes. The
first consideration is the extent to which an agent in an emotion state is responsive to sanctions.
The second consideration is the extent to which an agent can be deterred from being in the
emotional state in situations in which it may lead to harm.
Emotion state deterrability. A person in an emotion state may be sensitive to sanctions.
Deterrability depends both on (1) the kind of the emotion and (2) the intensity. In the emotion
state a person experiences a heightened preference, relative to the calm state, to “consume” the
emotion-relevant good. But the person has other preferences as well. An angry person wants to
28

See, e.g., David W. Harder, Shame and Guilt Assessment, and Relationships of Shame- and Guilt-Proneness to
Psychopathology 368, in Self-Conscious Emotions: The Psychology of Shame, Guilt, Embarrassment, and Pride
(June Price Tangney & Kurt W. Fischer eds. 1995) (discussing the relationship between shame and guilt, and
psychological disorders such as depression, substance abuse, suicide, and delinquency).
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strike the offender, but many angry people restrain themselves because they continue to want
their freedom, their job, their assets, and the other good things they might lose if convicted of
assault or murder. But even putting this aside it is important to realize that most emotions –
anger is the conspicuous exception – do not create a powerful preference to harm another person.
Disgust typically involves a preference to withdraw, not to attack, and that is why disgust rarely
excuses assault or murder. Fear typically involves a preference to flee or freeze, not to attack,
though attacking may be a reaction in some cases, and panic may lead to harm when the agent is
responsible for the well-being of an infant or incompetent person. Although a disgusted or
fearful person’s indifference curve will “tilt” dramatically, it does not tilt in the direction of
injuring another person; indeed, that preference will become weak relative to the desire to escape
the stimulus.
In addition, a person’s emotion state can be more or less extreme relative to the calm
state. A person can be made more or less angry by a provocation. A mere insult will, on
average, anger a person less than an unprovoked slap on the face. Graphically, an angry person’s
indifference curve may shift out a lot or a little; if a little, then his behavior will change
correspondingly. A slightly angry person will suppress the desire to lash out if the consequences
are more than trivial, and may, if at all, indulge his preference by muttering or complaining about
the offender to a third party.
Both these observations explain why from a deterrence perspective being in an emotion
state is not a sufficient condition for reduced culpability. A person remains deterrable if,
generally speaking, the emotion is not anger, or the emotion is anger but it is not intense. It
makes sense to reduce the sanction for an act committed during an emotion state if (1) the
emotion is anger (or another emotion that causes people to injure others, like fear, possibly) and
it is quite intense, so that high expected sanctions cannot deter the behavior, and (2) sanctions are
costly, which they are when they involve imprisonment.29 The justification is that expensive
sanctions should not be wasted on people who cannot be deterred by them.30
Pre-emotion (calm) state deterrability. Imagine that a person in an emotion state is
undeterrable. The sanction cannot be made high enough to prevent him from acting. It does not
follow that he must be excused from a crime that follows from the action tendency.
To see why, one must observe that a person in the calm state often foresees the stimuli
that will provoke the emotion state and also his actions in the emotion state. The calm state
preferences might very well reflect some things (a long-term desire to stay out of jail) and not
other things (an immediate desire to strike an offender) that are the reverse in the emotion state.
Thus, acting on his calm state preferences the person might take precautions against entering the
emotion state, including cultivating more peaceful emotions or avoiding the stimulus, though he
29

Cf. Richard A. Posner, Emotion versus Emotionalism in Law 312-13, in Bandes, supra note __ (arguing that
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will not if he thinks that his irascibility produces returns valued in the calm state, including a
reputation for toughness. In any event, sanctions may be desirable for influencing “investment”
behavior during the calm state.
Reducing the sanction for emotional behavior, relative to unemotional behavior, is
justified even when the sanction does not deter emotion state behavior when (1) the calm state
preferences and emotion state preferences differ only a little (EPUC is low); (2) the agent cannot
avoid the stimulus or reduce the intensity of his emotional reaction at relatively low cost
(elasticity is low); and (3) sanctions are relatively expensive (jail, not fines). (Note that this puts
aside the incapacitation goal of imprisonment, which may justify imprisoning highly dangerous
people who engage in undeterrable conduct.) The first factor essentially refers to the benefit the
agent obtains by avoiding the emotion state; the second factor refers to the cost of avoiding the
emotion state. Even putting aside sanctions, we expect people who very much dislike the
preferences of their emotion-state selves to take steps to avoid the emotion state unless those
steps are very costly. The criminal law must take account of this first stage of action.
Table 1 summarizes the argument so far.
Table 1

pre-emotion
state deterrability

high
low

emotion-state deterrability
high
low
punish
do not punish

Table 1 shows that the strongest case for reducing criminal punishment on deterrence grounds
occurs when the agent cannot be easily deterred in the emotion state and cannot easily avoid the
emotion state either by avoiding the stimulus or changing his temperament.31 The emotion has to
be the right type (anger or fear, typically) and it must be intense. When these conditions are not
met, the case for reducing the punishment is weaker.
Some examples. Murder is reduced to voluntary manslaughter not just when the
wrongdoer acts under the influence of emotion. The emotion usually must be anger, not (say)
disgust. Anger causes people to attack others; disgust causes them to withdraw. The anger must
be intense, not mild: a provocation that would excuse murder in the heat of passion does not
excuse murder committed a while later.32 Distinctions regarding the adequacy of provocation
can be understood in terms of the elasticity of investment. People who kill adulterous spouses
can hardly be expected to avoid the stimulus (not get married in the first place?). But people
who look for trouble in bars, especially homophobes who look for trouble in gay bars, could
easily avoid provocation that leads to murderous rage. Kahan and Nussbaum want to put in the
same category as murderous homophobes, women who kill brutal husbands and men who kill
adulterous wives or girlfriends,33 so that they can argue that the law’s inconsistent treatment of
homophobes and these other wrongdoers contradicts the deterrence argument. But a woman who
31
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kills a drunken, brutal husband is unlikely to be a threat to the rest of society, or even to future
husbands or boyfriends so long as they are not also drunken and brutal. A man whose wife or
girlfriend cheated on him cannot be expected to refrain thereafter from any relationship with
another woman. These people are not generally as dangerous as the person whose hatred causes
him to kill homosexuals, and it is less difficult for a homophobe to avoid gay bars than for men
and women to avoid having relationships with each other. Of course, those among the latter who
are as dangerous – those who kill multiple husbands or wives – are punished more seriously.
Similar comments apply to the case of fear. Louise Woodward, who was hired as a
nanny, was found guilty of killing the infant in her care, but the trial judge reduced a verdict of
second-degree murder to manslaughter on the ground that the evidence disclosed “confusion,
fright, a bad judgment, rather than rage or malice.”34 Supposing that Woodward really was
panicking, the explanation for reducing the conviction is that sanctions do not deter people who
are gripped by fear, and although most panicking people do not attack others, it is possible that a
terrified caregiver might injure a child. One might argue that severe sanctions would deter fearprone people from becoming nannies, but fear-induced killing is so rare and bizarre that the
elasticity of investment with respect to fear must be considered quite low. Should the convicted
killer take on a new position as nanny, however, and while panicking kill that child as well, one
anticipates a very high sanction. She should have learned of her own unreliability, and avoided
situations in which it could harm third parties.
Not all emotions should reduce the sanction. Hate crime laws increase, rather than,
reduce sanctions, even though the racist killer more plausibly acted under the influence of
emotion than, say, the contract killer. The reason that hate results in greater punishment, while
anger often results in a lesser punishment, is that hate is more susceptible to pre-emotion-state
manipulation than anger is. The person who hates members of a particular race can often avoid
interacting with them; he can also take care not to carry weapons. The person provoked to anger
by adultery is not in a similar position. The two emotions differ on the dimension of elasticity.
Turning now to the defense of duress, Kahan and Nussbaum ask us to compare (1) a
woman who commits armed robbery to avoid being beaten up; (2) a woman who fails to protect
her child in order to avoid being beaten up. Woman 1 has a duress defense; woman 2 does not.
Kahan and Nussbaum say that this is inconsistent with the narrow consequentialist view that
people who are susceptible only to extreme threats do not pose a danger to others, so punishment
would be wasteful.35 But the law makes sense on deterrence grounds. Sanctioning woman 1 is
not likely to change behavior because a person gripped by fear develops a strong preference for
self-preservation and ordinary altruistic concerns diminish. But ordinary experience suggests
that altruism for one’s own child remains salient even for a scared person. When we are
threatened, we run away if alone but grab our children if they are with us. If this is not true for
our woman 2, then a heavy sanction might offset her subjective gain, and it is no more surprising
that we punish her than that we punish anyone who engages in child abuse. Kahan and
Nussbaum argue a consequentialist argument assumes that legal decisionmakers “are prepared to
endorse the first woman’s valuation of her own welfare but not the second woman’s.”36 But this
34
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is not right. We want neither woman to commit a crime: but we punish the first woman less
because a sanction is less likely to deter her.
The theory explains historical changes in the treatment of cuckolds who murder spouses
discovered in flagrante, interracial murders, people who murder homosexuals who proposition
them, battered women who murder husbands, and so forth.37 As society’s evaluation of the
behavior changes, it increases or reduces sanctions accordingly, in order to encourage people to
invest in proper emotional dispositions and to avoid provocation otherwise, not just in the hope
that the prospect of sanctions will influence the agent while in the emotion state. Anger and
shame become less important and desirable sources of social order as the legal system
modernizes; so over time, law will excuse less behavior motivated by anger and shame, in the
hope of encouraging people to invest in the proper emotional dispositions.
A final point is that the criminal law should vary from region to region if there is crosscultural variation in average emotional disposition. Nisbett and Cohen provide experimental
evidence that in the United States southerners are more easily provoked to anger by an insult
than northerners are.38 If, as seems likely, the elasticity of investment with respect to anger states
is low, then we would expect southern states to punish crimes committed while angry and in
response to provocation, less than northern states, holding constant the cost of imprisonment.
Because southerners are less likely to respond to sanctions while angry, already take more care to
avoid provocation, and are unlikely to be able to modify dispositions that are mostly the result of
upbringing, scarce prison resources are better devoted to deterring other crimes, than in then
north.39
Regret. A prominent feature of criminal sentencing is the defendant’s expression of
regret or refusal to express regret. If the expression is sincere, then it is highly relevant to the
purposes of criminal punishment, for it reveals the distance between the defendant’s calm state
preferences and emotion state preferences if the crime occurred in an emotion state. If the
distance is great, then the deterrence goal requires a reduction in the sentence, all else equal,
because that suggests that the defendant will when calm take steps to avoid the emotion state
(EPUC is high), so that criminal behavior is unlikely to recur, and a severe sanction is not
necessary to deter further criminal behavior. Defendants who do not express regret for criminal
behavior are dangerous because their calm state preferences are antisocial, and they should be
punished either for the purpose of deterrence (if they are deterrable) or incapacitation (if they are
not deterrable but are sufficiently dangerous).40
A note on tort. The analysis of emotion in tort law is similar to the analysis for criminal
law. Suppose that an individual must drive to work every day but is subject to, and knows
himself subject to, road rage when other drivers cut him off. While under the influence of road
37
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rage, the individual drives much more carelessly than when he is calm; for example, he might
drive more quickly and pay less attention. Formally, his emotion state preference to drive
quickly is more intense than his calm state preference to drive quickly (or, alternatively, the cost
of driving carefully increases). For concreteness, suppose that the individual’s cost of driving
carefully is $100 when enraged, but the cost is only $10 when the individual is calm. Further,
suppose that the social cost of driving quickly is $50 in expected accident costs imposed on third
parties. A negligence rule, technically applied, would excuse the enraged driver from liability,
whereas strict liability would require him to pay $50 in expected terms. Strict liability is the
superior rule, for it would encourage the calm state person, who is stuck with the $50 liability
imposed on him by his emotion state self, to switch to public transportation or avoid congested
streets where road rage is more likely provoked. Alternatively, the individual could be held
negligent for not taking public transportation when he knows himself subject to road rage, just as
an epileptic is held liable for driving with knowledge of his epilepsy.41 The latter alternative
achieves the same result as strict liability by counterfactually attributing calm state abilities and
preferences to the emotion state self that causes the accident.
IV. Juries
There is a widespread view that jurors should deliberate calmly and dispassionately,
rather than in a state of emotion. This is why judges should not admit prejudicial evidence, that
is, evidence that (among other things) excites the emotions.42 This view also is behind resistance
to victim impact statements. But there is an alternative view. Some critics of capital punishment
argue that the current sentencing practices suppress jurors’ natural empathetic reaction to the
defendant’s position. These critics seem to argue that emotion should play a role in capital
sentencing.43 And defenders of punitive damages often say that this remedy is an appropriate
form of expressing outrage at the defendant’s conduct.
To understand this debate, one needs a clear view of what juries are supposed to do. For
simplicity, let us focus on the problem of determining liability (rather than punishment or
sentencing). Juries are supposed to determine whether a civil plaintiff has proved his case to be
more likely than not. Let us take a simple negligence case in which the only relevant variables
are (to simplify again): the defendant’s precaution, the probability of the harm given that
precaution, and the actual harm.
Suppose that the plaintiff wants to show the jury a photograph of the victim’s gory
injuries. The photograph would predictably elicit a feeling of disgust among the jurors. They
will look but avert their faces, feel nausea, and so forth. Let us suppose the feeling of disgust
lingers through their deliberations, perhaps because the deliberations involve continual
examination of the photograph or they provoke memories of the photograph and with them the
sensation of disgust. The question is whether these feelings are likely to interfere with the jury’s
41
A person will not ordinarily be held negligent if he crashes during a heart attack, epileptic seizure, or insane
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ability to evaluate precautions, probabilities, and harms.
The answer is probably no. The action tendency of disgust is withdrawal from the object
and is felt most strongly in the presence of that object. During that limited period of time, the
agent’s normal cognitive capacities may be short-circuited. But the farther removed the object is,
the less intense the action tendency is, and the more likely the agent is to take account of the rest
of the world. I think this is true even if the image of the disgusting object renews itself in the
agent’s mind as he deliberates about the appropriate outcome of the case. In any event, because
disgust does not cause people to want to punish, it does not seem likely that a disgusted jury will
react by exaggerating the harm imposed on the victim and awarding incorrect damages.
The photograph might also provoke anger or horror. These emotions are more
troublesome. If the jurors feel anger at the defendant, they might want to punish him, even
though the repulsiveness of the injury has nothing to do with the defendant’s culpability. A
merely negligent defendant whose tort severely disfigures the victim should not be forced to pay
more than a reckless defendant whose tort has, say, purely pecuniary consequences or less
disfiguring physical consequences, holding the extent of the harm constant. It is not clear,
though, that jurors would make this error. Their anger is not based on a personal insult against
them, but is more akin to the indignation that one feels on learning of a wrong, and it is not clear
that indignation results in the same tendency to inflict harm.44 On the other hand, some
experimental evidence suggests that people in a state of anger or outrage will punish the
defendant more harshly than they would otherwise, even though they are not directly harmed.45
This concern, that “blood will have blood,” seems to lie behind judicial decisions to exclude gory
photographs when their probative value is outweighed by their prejudicial impact.46
Can emotions improve the jury’s ability to make a correct judgment? It is tempting to
think so, because emotions are often adaptive. A standard argument about fear, for example, is
that it enables an organism to escape threats; and if the flight response is often inaccurate,
resulting in fear when a threat is not actually present, false positives are in this context much less
44
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important than false negatives.47 The problem with this argument is that the law takes account of
problems of proof with evidentiary and procedural rules, and assumes that the jury will simply
make its best judgment. To continue with our example, emotion will not improve the jury’s
ability to determine the cost of the defendant’s precaution or the likelihood that the precaution
would produce the injury complained of. Emotion will not improve the jury’s ability to measure
medical costs, financial losses, and similar measurable harms. And it seems likely, though the
issue is more arguable, that emotion will not improve the jury’s ability to measure pain and
suffering. Although a gory photograph might bring home to a jury the extent of the injury, and
the fear it might have produced, there is no reason for thinking that the jury’s response will be
accurate. The jury that does not see the photograph might underestimate the pain, and the jury
that sees the photograph might overestimate the pain, but there is no reason to believe that one
estimate will be close to the truth than the other. And to the extent that the gory photograph
helps the jury estimate the pain, this should be understood as a cognitive improvement brought
about by increased information. The horror of the situation depicted, if it results in outrage, is
likely to produce erratic awards.48
These considerations bear on the debate on the use of victim impact statements in capital
sentencing. Proponents of the use of these statements have argued that by creating pity for the
victim and the victim’s family, the statements counterbalance the natural sympathy that jurors
feel for the criminal defendant, whose presence in the courtroom gives him an empathic
advantage. Opponents argue that the statements distract the jury with irrelevant information and
inflame them against the defendant. 49 If the purpose of capital punishment is to deter murder or
incapacitate murderers, then pity and outrage are surely irrelevant to capital sentencing. The
only relevant consideration is the dangerousness of the criminal, something that can be evaluated
without emotional involvement. Jurors gripped by fear, pity, or outrage will overestimate or
underestimate the danger posed by the defendant. To banish these emotions, victim impact
statements like other forms of evidence should contain only relevant facts. If the purpose of
capital punishment is to express outrage or vindicate retributive instincts, then it still is the case
that jurors should behave unemotionally in making the appropriate determination. There is no
reason why victim impact statements should be treated differently from other forms of evidence:
they should be permitted unless their prejudicial effects outweigh their relevance.50
Little else can be said at this high level of abstraction, but empirical testing would shed
light on these issues. It is common in psychological research to test the effect of emotions on
47
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decision-makers by “priming” subjects with emotion-provoking stimuli.51 One possible
experiment would involve giving tort or criminal cases to subjects, and asking them to determine
liability or guilt, and damages or punishment. The control group would be given a verbal
description of the tort or crime; the other group would be given the same description plus a gory
picture. The prediction is that the latter group would be more likely to find liability or guilt, and
more likely to award higher damages or to impose harsher sentences. One could test the extent
to which emotions interfere with or promote accuracy by ensuring that there is a correct legal
answer (for example, award compensatory damages, stipulate that the victim felt no pain and did
not suffer in any way, and provide a formula for determining damages). One could also test the
effect of gory versus non-gory photographs, for example, the photograph of a mutilated corpse
and the photograph of a non-mutilated corpse. An issue of interest is whether a jury punishes
criminal or civil defendants who engage in exactly the same amount of harm, on the morally and
legally irrelevant basis of whether the harm is bloody or otherwise disgusting or horrifying.
Surprisingly, no one, to my knowledge, has done such empirical analysis.
Another experiment would test my claim that disgust, unlike anger, has little influence on
jurors’ deliberation. The key here is to use a photograph that is disgusting but unlikely to
provoke anger, because the defendant is not responsible for the harm. Suppose, for example, that
an insurance company must pay an insured an amount that will compensate her for the loss of
her husband’s earnings after the husband commits suicide. The sole issue at trial is that of
calculating the loss. Let that calculation involve the valuation of a number of imponderables.
Though one would expect variation in the awards, my claims about disgust imply that jurors
shown a photograph of the mangled corpse would not systematically award higher amounts than
jurors who are given a sketchy description.
These and similar experiments would clarify the meaning of prejudice in evidence law,
and enable judges to be more discriminating when withholding photographs and other evidence
because of concerns that they may lead to inappropriate evaluations by jurors.
V. Cost-Benefit Analysis and Risk Regulation
In a recent article Timur Kuran and Cass Sunstein argue that various cognitive biases can
lead to panicked government action that is socially harmful.52 They focus on the availability
heuristic, “a pervasive mental shortcut whereby the perceived likelihood of any given event is
tied to the ease with which its occurrence can be brought to mind.”53 Because people rely on the
availability heuristic and other cognitive shortcuts, they fear risks not solely on the basis of the
expected harm, but on the basis of strictly irrelevant factors such as the degree to which the risks
are subject to public discussion, the harm is vivid, the technology is new, the results are
irreversible, and so forth. In the meantime, dissenting views are ignored, dissenters are treated
with opprobrium, and so dissent is suppressed. As a consequence, initially exaggerated beliefs
about risks can feed on each other, resulting in an “availability cascade,” in which a minor risk is
blown up into a major threat. Kuran and Sunstein’s main examples are the Love Canal scare, the
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Alar scare, and the response to the crash of TWA flight 800. In all these cases, a relatively trivial
risk or benign explanation is overtaken by events, resulting in a panic in which the worst case is
widely believed.
A notable aspect of Kuran and Sunstein’s explanation is that it is purely cognitive.
People are assumed to be rational except to the extent that cognitive biases interfere with rational
choice. Their argument predicts that availability cascades would occur even in a hypothetical
world in which people had no emotions.
But there are some reasons for being skeptical of this view. Start with the obvious
semantic point that Love Canal, and similar events, are often called “scares” or “panics.” Kuran
and Sunstein’s account of the Love Canal affair repeatedly notes the emotional character of the
events: “frightening tales spread quickly”;54 “residents feared...” various dangers;55 “[a]ngered by
claims in” a newspaper, one resident organized a petition drive;56 a woman at a meeting “started
crying hysterically”;57 “[h]er anxieties and fears came to be shared by the entire community”;58
one activist was “furious” ... “Now very emotional, I said: “You can’t do that! That would be
murder!”;59 “fears would not dissipate”;60 and so forth. Although Kuran and Sunstein could
argue that the emotional responses were epiphenomenal, and that cognitive bias fully explains
the phenomenon, an emotion-based theory cannot be discounted. Most panics, as the term
suggests, are characterized by fear.
One influential psychological theory of fear holds that it is an evolutionarily adaptive
mechanism for processing information about potential threats to the organism. It is
evolutionarily more costly for an organism to fail to respond to a threat than it is for the organism
to respond incorrectly. That is, you are less likely to survive and reproduce if you sometimes
neglect to flee from a tiger than if you occasionally flee from a shadow that looks like a tiger.
Certain genetically determined or learned stimuli (snakes, and so forth) are processed in a rough
way by a part of the brain before being subject to cognition, a bit like the reflex action of
withdrawing one’s hand from a hot object.61 Thus, fear (and anxiety as well) has benefits and
costs: it allows the organism to respond quickly to a threat, but it also appears to cause the
organism to overpredict the probability of the threat. In our framework, fear results in distorted
beliefs but also lower costs.
The connection between an individual’s fear and a social panic occurs as follows. First,
fear is contagious. A person who observes that another person is fearful is more likely to
become fearful than a person who does not make such an observation. This may, of course, be
rational in a sense; but it also seems to be a purely psychological or even physiological

54

Id., at 691-92.
Id., at 692.
56
Id.
57
Id., at 693.
58
Id., at 692.
59
Id., at 693, quoting Lois Marie Gibbs, Love Canal: The Story Continues ... 30 (1998).
60
Id., at 694.
61
Arne Öhman, Fear and Anxiety as Emotional Phenomena: Clinical Phenomenology, Evolutionary Perspectives,
and Information-Processing Mechanisms 511, 520, in Lewis & Haviland, supra note __.
55

22

Law and the Emotions

response.62 Second, fear feeds on itself: observing that another is fearful, one’s own fear may
become heightened. Third, fear, unlike some other emotions such as anger, can persist for quite
a long time, sometimes in the form of a general anxiety. Fearful and anxious people continue to
overestimate the probability of a threat, and to reinforce each others’ incorrect beliefs.
The emotion perspective can be seen as a supplement to Kuran and Sunstein’s cognitive
theory, which itself indeed can be seen as a supplement to a rational choice view based on
information imperfections. It is rational to infer that a threat exists if others believe that a threat
exists.63 This inference may be strengthened by the availability heuristic, a cognitive bias. And
the inference may be strengthened further by the emotion of fear, which leads the fearful
individual to exaggerate (relative to calm-state beliefs) not any widely publicized risk (as
suggested by the availability heuristic), but in particular those risks that pose threats that engage
the fear-centered portions of the brain.
This last observation leads to the question of normative implications. Kuran and
Sunstein’s analysis of availability cascades lead them to call for greater insulation of
decisionmakers, greater reliance on scientists and other experts, and greater use of analytic tools
like cost-benefit analysis.64 These are surely appropriate responses when panics are the result of
fear as well as cognitive biases.
But it also would be useful to know whether different panics have different explanations,
and therefore justify different government responses. A bank panic, for example, is calm-state
rational. Given that the bank’s liabilities exceed its liquid assets, I am rational to withdraw my
money if I believe others will withdraw their money. This is a classic n-player prisoner’s
dilemma. Bank panics would occur even if people never made cognitive errors or experienced
intense emotions. This may explain why bank panics are so easily ended: the government just
needs to make a credible promise to reimburse all depositors.
By contrast, the preference for driving over flying appears to be emotion-driven. I
conjecture that people are more anxious about flying than about driving because when danger
provokes fear, driving does not prevent one from fleeing (one pulls over to the shoulder) but
flying does (one is stuck in the tube).
A frequent criticism of aggressive airline safety regulation is that costly precautions cause
people to substitute to automobiles for short trips, which in fact are more dangerous, so certain
airline safety regulations may increase fatalities rather than reduce them.65 A common response
is that people’s subjective discomfort with airline travel should be counted as a social cost.
Although airline safety regulation may increase aggregate fatalities as people substitute to
automobiles because of cost, it may still increase social welfare as the travelers experience less
emotional discomfort.
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The problem with this response is that fear, dread, and anxiety are not sensitive to
changes in low probabilities.66 A person who feels an overpowering feeling of dread while
riding on an airplane will feel the same amount of dread whether the probability of an accident is
1 in 100,000 or 1 in 1,000,000. So the safety precaution does not increase that person’s
subjective well-being. If the person rationally anticipates his dread, he will treat it as a fixed cost
regardless of the probability of accident (within constraints, obviously), so his determination
whether to fly or drive will depend entirely on the pecuniary costs. This observation rescues the
standard criticism of safety regulation from the economic response: subjective (emotional)
discomfort should not play a critical role in safety regulation.67
As another example of what is at stake, consider the problem of genetically altered food,
which is widely avoided in Europe. On the rational herding view, individuals in Europe
rationally avoid this food because others avoid this food, and each person, individually rationally
but collectively disastrously, infers that every person acts on statistically independent pieces of
information. The reason that this story is probably false is that in the herd behavior models, the
suboptimal equilibria are fragile.68 If genetically altered food poses risks no greater than those
that people already face, and if people were rational, then the panic would not have lasted as long
as it has.
There is probably some truth to the cognitive view of this panic. Concerns about
genetically altered food probably stem from the mad cow disease problem in England, which
was a highly salient event. But we know that emotional reactions often interfere with cognition.
The argument in favor of genetic alteration of food, which is that it is not much different from
breeding that has occurred for thousands of years, does not stick in people’s minds, and it may be
that it does not for the same reason that a person who sees a snake in a cage jumping at him
“forgets,” or simply does not process, the fact that the snake is behind a pane of glass, and that a
person will not eat a cockroach that has been sterilized. This argument requires a jump from the
primal fear and disgust responses, to a more complex, culturally mediated fear/disgust response,
about which little is know. But it is a reasonable hypothesis.
The cognitive and emotion views leave a lot unexplained. If the British had all become
vegetarians in response to mad cow disease, the views could have rationalized that response as
well. But a similar objection can be made to the rational choice argument as well.
These methodological difficulties do not alter the fact it matters which view is correct.
To see why, consider the question over whether it is appropriate for automobile manufacturers to
install switches that allow consumers to deactivate air bags. Reluctance about permitting these
switches stems from fears that publicity about the dangers that air bags pose to children and
small adults may lead people to deactivate air bags even when doing so enhances the net danger
to passengers.69
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The proper regulatory action depends on the source of people’s false beliefs about air
bags. If the incorrect belief that air bags are on net dangerous results from rational ignorance,
the proper response is simply to post labels explaining that people should activate the air bags
unless a child or small adult is in the front seat. If the belief is the result of a cognitive bias like
the availability heuristic, the label may be an insufficient response. Perhaps, a great deal of
advertising would be necessary in order to shift people’s beliefs; or, alternatively, nothing can
shake people’s beliefs and the best response is to make it impossible to deactivate the air bags.
If the belief is the result of fear or panic, one or more of the following responses might be
appropriate. (1) Permit installation of the switch, because emotion states tend to weaken and
then disappear as time passes. As people become accustomed to the presence of air bags, they
will be less likely to deactivate them inappropriately. (2) Prohibit installation of the switch,
because emotions are, even more than cognitive biases, impervious to reasoning. When
panicked people trample each other to escape a sinking ship, no amount of reasoning will save
them. (3) Permit installation, and fight emotion with emotion. When people are afraid, make
them feel ashamed. When they are angry, make them feel pity. Lawyers, politicians,
advertisers, and many other professionals are skilled in the tricky art of manipulating people’s
emotions. Sappy commercials have already been used to encourage the use of seat belts by
cleverly framing seatbelt use as an obligation that people owe to their loved ones rather than as a
means of protecting themselves. Similarly, sappy commercials could be used to show that air
bag use is necessary to protect loved ones (unless they are small adults or children). Without
expressing any opinion on whether such commercials, sappy or not, are effective, I will just note
that Madison Avenue as well as the government usually run vivid, emotionally stimulating
commercials, more so than dry recitations of facts.
VI.

Bargaining, Contract Law, and Property and Liability Rules:
A Critique of Specific Performance

Much economic analysis of property rights assumes that when transaction costs are low,
parties can bargain around inefficient allocations of property rights. “Transaction cost” is an
ambiguous term, but it is generally limited to situations in which bargaining would involve large
numbers of people, or people who do not know each other’s identities. A theme of the literature
is that when transaction costs are low, it is more important for courts to ensure that property
rights are clear and so easily tradable, than assigned to the more efficient user, because the ability
to trade ensures that the property right will end up where it is most valued.70
Ward Farnsworth informally tested this view by interviewing lawyers who represented
individuals involved in nuisance suits.71 Lawyers reported that plaintiffs who obtained
November 21, 1997 62 Fed. Reg. 62,406, 62414 (noting that widespread fear of air bags would lead to deactivation
of them if that were possible, even when they enhance safety).
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judgments in nuisance cases never sold their rights to the defendants. The most plausible reason
emerges from the descriptions of the cases. “They [the parties] hate each other.”72 A lawyer’s
client’s reaction to an offer “would have been to say ‘not only “No” but “Hell, no.”’”73 There
was “too much bad blood.”74 They “disliked each other intensely.”75 No doubt the disputes
followed the same pattern. The plaintiff was angered by the nuisance, which was considered
unneighborly. The defendant was angered by the plaintiff’s complaints and lawsuit. Irritation
became enmity as the usual indignities of litigation ensued. By the end, anger and hatred were
so intense that (in Farnsworth’s view) not even mutually beneficial trade would have been
possible.
These case studies conform to the common sense intuition that anger interferes with
bargaining.76 These intuitions are consistent with theoretical and empirical work on anger.
Anger typically occurs when another person offends or insults the agent, which usually means
violation of a recognized norm of respect. An angry person’s action tendency is to harm the
offender, even at cost to oneself. When two sides of a dispute are angry with each other, they
may both do better (in subjective utility terms) by inflicting costs on each other in the form of
continuing litigation, than by settling. If each party gains more by injuring the other than by
being injured himself, this game is not a prisoner’s dilemma: harming the other person is both
the dominant strategy for both parties and the welfare-maximizing equilibrium. At the same
time, a person’s ex ante calm preference is to avoid fighting and to trade when there are (nonspite-related) gains from doing so. The calm state and emotion state preferences are in conflict,
and if the former are to be privileged (on which, see below), then the emotion state preferences
must be discounted.
These considerations suggest that the assignment and protection of property rights should
be sensitive to the emotional valence of disputes. Consider the well-known defense of specific
performance. If the value of performance exceeds the cost, the promisor ought to perform, and
specific performance (unlike expectation damages) does not require an error-prone judicial
determination of the promisee’s valuation. If the value of performance is less than the cost, the
promisor can bribe the promisee to release him from the contract. The advantage of the damages
remedy is that it enables the promisor to breach efficiently without negotiating; but given low
transaction costs this advantage has little value, and transaction costs are likely to be low when
there are only two parties.77 Thus, specific performance is superior to damages.
The problem with this argument is that the promisor’s breach may provoke the
promisee’s anger, and the promisee – feeling insulted – will refuse to release the promisee from
the contract. This is very much in the spirit of Farnsworth’s interviews. This potential refusal
the methodology: it is, after all, common knowledge that parties to lawsuits settle more often than they litigate, and
it would be surprising that whatever factors interfere with bargaining would increase sharply at the time of
judgment.
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might not matter if the promisor tries to buy out the promisee rather than breaching first, but
there are two further points of concern. First, it is hard to say whether even broaching the subject
of nonperformance would not elicit an angry reaction, which would then interfere with
negotiations. Second, negotiations would in any event occur in the shadow of the promisee’s
angry reaction to breach.
Imagine, then, that an exogenous event causes a seller’s cost to exceed the buyer’s
valuation. Under specific performance, if the seller breaches, she must either perform or pay the
buyer’s entire valuation. But if the buyer is angry, the buyer will incur a cost to spite the seller,
and this means that the buyer may insist on performance even though he values it less than a
proposed payment equal to the entire surplus. Anticipating this, the seller performs rather than
breaches. By contrast, under expectation damages the seller would breach and pay damages
equal to the buyer’s valuation, with the inefficient trade avoided. Expectation damages is
superior to specific performance because the plaintiff cannot prevent an efficient trade in order to
spite the victim.78
An important premise of this argument is that the buyer’s calm state preferences matter
while his anger state preferences do not matter. If the buyer’s anger state preferences matter,
only specific performance can protect them. Now, ex ante the buyer most likely would prefer
that his anger state preferences be discounted. If that view is entitled to respect, then courts
should award expectation damages; otherwise, the seller will pass the costs on to the buyer and
the buyer will be forced, against his calm state preferences, to purchase the right when angry to
spite the buyer! To be sure, some buyers might want this right, but this seems unusual. As long
as calm state preferences are to be counted, and buyers want their calm state preferences to be
counted, expectation damages is superior to specific performance when breach would lead to
anger.
Notice that emotion introduces an asymmetry into the standard analysis of contract
remedies. The person who breaches will not feel any anger, while the victim of the breach is
likely to become angry. The reason is that the contract sets up a background norm of
performance, and the person who breaks that norm injures the person who complies with it. If it
is not desirable for trade to occur, which will often be the case, expectation damages have the
virtue of giving the property right to the calm person, whereas specific performance has the
defect of giving the property right to the angry person. If it is desirable for trade to occur, the
choice of remedy does not matter. Taking ex ante calm-state preferences as the normative
baseline, specific performance reduces the value of contracts.
Further factors might bear on the choice between remedies in specific situations. Anger
subsides rapidly when the agent realizes that the offensive act was unintentional or in some way
justified: if you push me, I might get angry, but my anger dissolves when you explain that you
tripped and grabbed at me to prevent yourself from falling, or that you were running away from a
78
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mugger. Similarly, anger – and thus specific performance – may pose fewer problems when a
breach is excusable rather than willful. It is notoriously difficult to distinguish excusable from
willful breaches in contract cases, but one possible approach is to distinguish breaches when the
trade is ex post inefficient (the promisor’s cost exceeds the buyer’s valuation) and breaches when
the trade is ex post efficient. The former can only be an attempt to hold up the promisee for a
higher payment, and so seem willful; the latter are at least jointly value-maximizing, and so
somewhat less objectionable.79
It is worth lingering on the subtleties involved in imposing legal sanctions against a
background regime of nonlegal sanctions.80 If, as Robert Frank argues, emotions evolve to
enable people to make credible their threat to retaliate if another person breaks a promise,81 then
this adaptation constrains the ability of the law to serve the same purpose. Frank argues that
people restrain themselves from breaking promises and engaging in other opportunistic behavior
in part because they fear retaliation. Retaliation is not always individually rational but may be
compelled by emotion. Thus, emotion solves a problem of cooperation. But if emotion causes
people to retaliate without carefully weighing the costs and benefits, people will retaliate even
when breach is jointly maximizing and both sides would do better if the promisor compensated
the promisee but did not perform. Giving the enraged promisee the tool of specific performance
enables him to exact retaliation when, given the availability of a more modest legal remedy like
expectation damages, both sides would do better (as measured by calm state preferences) if
retaliation did not occur.
The normative implication of this discussion is inconsistent with current law. Specific
performance and harsh remedies like punitive damages should not be available when the
promisor’s breach is egregious and thus likely to lead to an emotional response from the
promisee. Expectation damages are more appropriate. The same is true for nuisance suits:
money damages is the superior remedy when the nuisance creates anger and hard feelings,
assuming away the cost of determining damages. Injunctions are more suitable when emotion is
unlikely to interfere with bargaining.
VII. Normative issues
If emotions are, among other things, temporary alterations in a person’s preference
structure, then they raise the question whether these preferences should be counted in a social
welfare function. One might think that this question is trivial, because emotion states are
temporary. Angry people are not usually in the mood to answer contingent valuation
questionnaires. But, in fact, market behavior used to derive valuations may be influenced by
anger, anxiety, fear, and similar emotions; and many emotions – love, envy, pride, grief, joy –
may last for a long time and affect a great deal of behavior. Further, nothing in conventional
welfare economics implies that preferences in an emotion state should be discounted.
Common sense suggests, perhaps, that we should discount preferences held during an
emotion state. It is typical of an angry person that he ignores relevant information when making
79
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choices. Nussbaum argues that disgust is a form of magical thinking, and many judgments based
on disgust (like not wanting to eat a sterilized cockroach) do not reflect a person’s well-being.82
The right way to think of emotional preferences, then, is just to reject subjective welfarism,
which holds that unadjusted preferences are morally fundamental. Preferences, whether those in
the calm state or in an emotion state, should not be used as the basis for regulation unless they
are not “distorted” in some way. It is commonly argued that preferences are distorted if they are
uninformed, or adaptive in some sense (sour grapes), or morally objectionable; many welfarists,
for example, would not count sadistic preferences in the social welfare function, not because they
are emotional, but because they are morally wrong.83 One might argue that certain preferences
that manifest themselves in emotion states should not be counted for similar reasons. An angry,
disgusted, or fearful person focuses on one aspect of the world to the exclusion of others, so he
has a distorted perspective on the relationship between the world and his own (calm-state) wellbeing; his temporary preferences can be likened therefore to highly uninformed preferences,
which are commonly ignored in real-world regulation as well.
But the assumption that the emotion state preferences are defective is not self-evident.
The psychology literature insists that certain emotions spring into existence just because the
environment poses a threat to the agent’s well-being. For example, one might feel anxiety or
anger without knowing why because non-cognitive areas of the brain have detected a threat and
is preparing the individual to react. That person’s emotion-state behavior might be more
consistent with his well-being than the behavior in which he would engage if he were calm.
Disgust often reveals that a substance poses dangers of which the disgusted person has no
conscious knowledge. In general, a person in an emotion state may be more, rather than less,
perceptive about moral realities.84 Thus do people often describe themselves as roused to (moral)
action on the basis of photographs or stories that stimulate their indignation or horror.
Similar comments apply to emotional dispositions – and here the problem remains even if
people were always in calm states when filling out contingent valuation questionnaires or
engaging in market behavior. A person with an emotional disposition to feel disgust will take
this into account when (calmly) engaging in market behavior, or answering surveys that elicit
valuations for the purpose of cost-benefit analysis, knowing that at some later point the relevant
emotion will come into being. Suppose he feels disgusted whenever he sees adults of the same
sex holding hands. This person might be willing to pay for laws that discourage such behavior
because he wishes to avoid the sensation of disgust. The question is whether this person’s
preference should count, just as it would surely count if he were objecting to a noxious odor
caused by pollution. The interesting methodological question is whether we should look through
the lens of emotion or of morality. The lens of emotion might suggest that the preferences
should not count in this case, because they are based on magical thinking rather than a correct
assessment of the impact of the behavior on the person’s well-being.85 An alternative view is
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that the valuation should not be taken into account because it reflects a morally objectionable
judgment. This view does not depend on whether the agent feels disgust or any other emotion,
as would be the case if he insisted that his valuation is motivated by nothing other than a concern
for traditional morality.
The point I want to make, then, is that both emotion-state preferences and calm-state
preferences that reflect emotional disposition cannot automatically be either ignored as defective
because “emotional” or counted as “just preferences.” Both kinds of preferences must be
evaluated, and included in or excluded from the social welfare function, in accordance with the
degree to which satisfaction of them contributes to the individual’s well-being. There is an
analogy in Parfit’s discussion of successive selves. The present self might rationally discount the
interest of future selves, treating the latter almost like different persons.86 Similarly, a calm self
might rationally want to discount his emotion-state preferences. But just as it may be wrong (as
opposed to irrational) for the present self to take an action, like smoking, that will harm a future
self,87 it may be wrong for the calm self to discount the preferences felt by an emotional self.88
The reason is that the preferences of the emotional self are sometimes better attuned to the
agent’s well-being. But not always. And that is what makes normative analysis so difficult.
Conclusion
Emotions matter for legal theory because much behavior occurs under the influence of
emotion. The framework I propose is a simple alteration of the standard rational choice
approach, under which it is assumed that an individual’s preferences, abilities, and beliefs
predictably change during emotion states, and change back afterwards. This approach allows us
to understand how individuals take steps to manipulate their own emotional behavior (and
others’ as well, though I have not emphasized this89), and how the law can influence both
emotional behavior and behavior that can be taken in anticipation of emotion.

86

See Derek Parfit, Reasons and Persons 302-06 (1984).
Id., at 318-20.
88
The beginning and end of strong emotion states like love might, indeed, be breaks in the psychological
connectedness of successive selves. Cf. id., at 305-06.
89
But it comes up in legal contexts: for example, whether a confession is coerced if the police engage in emotional,
rather than physical torture.
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